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█ Abstract The open-ended character of natural languages calls for the hypothesis that humans are en-
dowed with a recursive procedure generating sentences which are hierarchically organized. Structural re-
lations such as c-command, expressed on hierarchical sentential representations, determine all sorts of 
formal and interpretive properties of sentences. The relevant computational principles are well beyond 
the reach of conscious introspection, so that studying such properties requires the formulation of precise 
formal hypotheses, and empirically testing them. This article illustrates all these aspects of linguistic re-
search through the discussion of non-coreference effects. The article argues in favor of the formal linguis-
tic approach based on hierarchical structures, and against alternatives based on vague notions of “analog-
ical generalization”, and/or exploiting mere linear order. In the final part, the issue of cross-linguistic in-
variance and variation of non-coreference effects is addressed.  
KEYWORDS: Linguistic Knowledge; Morphosyntactic Properties; Unconscious Computations; Corefer-
ence; Linguistic Representations 
 
█ Riassunto Conoscenza linguistica e computazioni inconsce – Il carattere aperto del linguaggio naturale 
avvalora l’ipotesi che gli esseri umani siano dotati di una procedura ricorsiva che genera frasi gerarchica-
mente organizzate. Relazioni strutturali come il c-comando, espresse su rappresentazioni frasali gerarchi-
che, determinano tutte le proprietà formali e interpretative delle frasi. I principi computazionali rilevanti 
sono totalmente al di fuori della portata della coscienza introspettiva e così lo studio di tali proprietà ri-
chiede la formulazione di precise ipotesi formali e la loro verifica sperimentale. Questo articolo illustra 
tutti questi aspetti della ricerca linguistica, esaminando gli effetti di non-coreferenza. Si argomenta in fa-
vore dell’approccio linguistico formale basato su strutture gerarchiche e contro alternative basate su va-
ghe nozioni di “generalizzazione analogica” e/o che impiegano il semplice ordine lineare. Nella parte fina-
le si affronta il tema dell’invarianza e della variazione cross-linguistica degli effetti di non-coreferenza. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Conoscenza linguistica; Proprietà morfosintattiche; Computazioni inconsce; Coreferen-
zialità; Rappresentazioni linguistiche 
 

█  Introduction 
 
ONE REMARKABLE PROPERTY OF HUMAN 
language is its unbounded character: speakers 
are constantly confronted with sentences they 
have not encountered in their previous linguis-
tic experience, and still they can easily integrate 
such new messages, understand them and 
properly respond in dialogue. In fact, any 
speaker potentially masters an unbounded 
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number of messages. This property caught the 
attention of major thinkers in the past: in par-
ticular, Descartes saw in it a test capable of dis-
criminating man and machine:1 no automaton, 
no matter how sophisticated, would be capa-
ble of what any man can do («ainsi que les 
hommes les plus hébétés peuvent faire»),2 
hear a new sentence and respond appropri-
ately to it, in a way that is neither determinis-
tic nor arbitrary. 
Once the unbounded character of lan-
guage is properly recognized, this has immedi-
ate implications for the nature of linguistic 
knowledge. “Knowing a language” cannot be 
equivalent to “having memorized a list of mes-
sages”, as the list would have to be infinite, 
and we would not have had enough time (or 
space in neural circuitry) to memorize it. The 
“memorized list” model may be essentially 
correct, at least for a first approximation, for 
our knowledge of the lexicon: we hear a new 
word, we figure out what it means, and we add 
it to our mental lexicon (it should be noted, 
though, that a list-based model is to be ex-
pressed with the proviso that the lexicon is not 
an unstructured list, but a highly structured 
system). But the list idea is not appropriate to 
capture our mastery of sentences. Clearly, the 
secret of the unbounded character of language 
is in its combinatorial nature: words can be 
combined to form sentences, so knowing a 
language means mastering the combinatorial 
laws that govern sentence formation. In other 
words, knowing a language means possessing 
a generative procedure, capable of computing 
an unbounded number of messages; acquiring 
a language means acquiring the lexicon, and 
mastering the combinatorial procedure to 
generate new messages. 
This is what is sometimes called the “com-
putational view” of linguistic knowledge, an 
important legacy of the study of language to 
the broader domain of cognitive neuroscience, 
as the idea of the “computational mind” 
proved to be viable in the study of the human 
cognitive capacities well beyond language, 
from vision, to reasoning, to motor control: 
having a cognitive capacity means possessing 
a mechanism for computing representations 
relevant for a specific cognitive domain, with 
properties which may be in part domain gen-
eral, and in part task-specific. 
Is there an alternative to this computational 
view? What is sometimes considered an alter-
native is the enrichment of the list model with 
the idea that the unbounded character of the 
system is due to our capacity for analogical 
generalization: during language acquisition, the 
child hears a finite number of messages and she 
memorizes them, so that the initial knowledge 
is “item-based”; at some later point, the child 
generalizes their properties to new massages 
through analogy as in the “neuroconstructivist” 
approach.3 The problem with this (very popu-
lar) view is that it is neither right nor wrong, if 
expressed at this level of generality: it is simply 
vacuous until when we give content to the no-
tions of “analogy” and “analogical generaliza-
tion” to capture the fact that certain “analogical 
generalizations” are unerringly made by all 
speakers (and all language learners), while oth-
er conceivable “analogical generalizations” are 
never made. But once we have properly struc-
tured the concept, so much structure emerges 
that the vague term “analogy” does not seem to 
be a felicitous terminological choice to address 
the “projection problem”, the fact that the child 
projects her finite linguistic experience onto an 
unbounded set of possible messages.4 
I would like to illustrate these issues 
through a simple example: the constraints on 
referential dependencies between nominal ex-
pressions and pronouns. The discussion will 
aim at making two points. On the one hand, a 
point that directly bears on the topic of this 
workshop: the knowledge that speakers unerr-
ingly manifest is completely unconscious, 
there is simply no way to introspectively pene-
trate the structural computations that we all 
perform when we evaluate the possible inter-
pretation of a pronoun in context; so the only 
thing to do to study this mental capacity is to 
formulate precise structural hypotheses, let 
them generate predictions, and test the pre-
dictions. This is true for this case, as well as for 
so many other cases of the study of non trivial 
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mental capacities, in language and other cog-
nitive domains. On the other hand, I will try 
to show that the knowledge that every speaker 
has about the possible referential dependen-
cies between nouns and pronouns obeys struc-
tural constraints which appear to go well be-
yond the reach of an unstructured notion of 
“analogical generalization”. A brief discussion 
of the invariance and variation observed 
across languages in the domain of coreference 
will conclude the paper. 
 
█  A constraint on coreference 
 
In certain sentences, a name (or other nom-
inal expression, for instance a definite descrip-
tion) and a pronoun can refer to the same indi-
vidual, or “corefer”. For instance, in (1), the 
name John and the pronoun he can corefer: 
 
(1) Johni said that hei was sick 
 
In other words, the sentence can mean 
“John said that he, John, was sick”: we may ex-
plicitly express coreference through the index-
ing notation, i.e., by assigning the same index 
(i) to the two coreferential elements, as in (1). 
Coreference is not obligatory (i.e., in (1) he 
could refer to Bill, who was introduced in the 
previous discourse in a context like Nobody un-
derstood why Bill had made such a mistake, but 
then…), but it is an option in cases like (1).  
Coreference is possible in certain environ-
ments and impossible in others. Consider (2) 
for instance: 
 
(2) * Hei said that Johni was sick 
 
The sentence is fine, but he can only refer to 
an individual different from John, e.g., Peter, 
introduced in previous discourse. Coreference 
(he, John) is excluded, and this is what the as-
terisk marking the sentence means: the sen-
tence is well-formed per se, but it is excluded 
with the interpretation expressed by the indi-
ces.  
Notice that the contrast (1)-(2) is immedi-
ately clear to all the speakers of English, and it 
is abstract knowledge, in the sense that it is 
completely independent from any particular 
knowledge of the discourse situation, or of the 
states of affairs in the factual world: I may very 
well not know anyone named John, and still if I 
hear somebody utter (1) I will assume that the 
speaker may mean that a certain guy John said 
that the same guy John was sick, while the 
speaker uttering (2) does not intend to convey 
that meaning. Clearly, we dispose of a proce-
dure allowing us to evaluate coreference, and 
the procedure discriminates between (1) and 
(2), completely independently of any 
knowledge of factual situations. 
What is this procedure? Here is the point of 
immediate relevance for our general theme. We 
perceive in a crystal clear manner the result of 
this mental procedure (coreference is possible 
here and impossible there), but the procedure 
itself is completely inaccessible to our conscious 
introspection.  
In introductory courses, I always do a little 
informal experiment in class, first testing stu-
dents on the contrastive judgment between the 
Italian equivalents of (1) and (2) (obviously ac-
cessible to everyone), and then asking them on 
what basis they are able to differentiate coref-
erence possibilities in the two examples. Vari-
ous hypotheses are made in the discussion in 
class, some rather complex, but one idea that 
always emerges, and strikes everyone for its 
simplicity and plausibility, is that speakers may 
use a linear strategy: 
 
(3) Linear strategy: A noun and a pronoun can 
corefer when the noun precedes the pro-
noun in the linear order of the words; if the 
pronoun precedes the noun, coreference is 
impossible: i.e.,  
 
a. ok  … Ni … Proni … 
b. *    … Proni … Ni … 
 
This hypothesis has the appeal of simplicity, 
and a considerable plausibility: after all, it 
makes perfect sense that we first introduce a 
referent with a noun, and then we refer back to 
it thorough a pronoun. Nevertheless, the linear 
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strategy is not the one speakers actually use 
within a complex sentence: there is literally an 
infinity of sentences (in English, Italian and 
other languages) in which the pronoun pre-
cedes the noun, and coreference is still possible. 
Here are some examples: 
 
(4) People who know himi well say that Johni is sick 
 
(5) isi father said that Johni was sick 
 
(6) When hei is sick, Johni does not go to work 
 
So, (4) can naturally admit the interpreta-
tion in which the pronoun him refers to John, 
in (5) his father may well mean John’s father, 
with the possessive his referring to John, he can 
naturally refer to John in (6), etc. There may be 
a moment of hesitation when coreference is 
evaluated in contexts in which the pronoun 
precedes the noun (contexts of “backward co-
reference”), but the contrast between (4)-(6) 
and the sharp impossibility of coreference is (2) 
is clear. 
So, what should we conclude from these ex-
amples? Speakers possess a procedure allowing 
them to evaluate coreference, and they apply it 
very efficiently and automatically to the sen-
tences they hear: the judgment on the interpre-
tation of (1), (2) etc. is clear and quickly deter-
mined by the speaker. Yet, speakers don’t have 
any conscious introspective access to the pro-
cedure: they only “see” the result. Clearly, the 
students who proposed the linear rule did not 
have introspective access to the procedure they 
were using, they simply formulated a hypothe-
sis on the nature of the procedure, based on the 
data they had access to, their own interpretive 
judgments on these sentences. The hypothesis 
turned out to be incorrect, but this is, in fact, 
the only way to proceed: formulate a precise 
hypothesis on the nature of the mechanism, 
submit it to empirical testing, and revise it in 
accordance with the empirical evidence. 
In order to successfully address the prob-
lem, we now need to sharpen our assumptions 
about the structural organization of linguistic 
representations. 
█  The hierarchical nature of syntactic repre-
sentations. 
 
A fundamental property of syntactic struc-
tures is that words forming sentences are as-
sembled into hierarchically organized units. 
Over fifty years of discussion on the fundamen-
tal combinatorial device led to the conclusion, 
within the Minimalist Program,5 that it has the 
simplest possible shape, an instruction which 
says “take two elements and string them to-
gether to form a third element”. This is the op-
eration Merge: 
Merge takes two elements, A and B, 
which can be items drawn from the function-
al or contentive lexicon, or partial structures 
already built by previous applications of 
Merge, and strings them together to form a 
new structural unit. Repeated applications of 
Merge give rise to hierarchical structures 
which can be expressed by familiar syntactic 
trees like the following:6  
Similar representations permit the defini-
tion of fundamental structural relations 
which govern the structuring of form and in-
terpretation. One very fundamental relation 
is c-command,7 which I will define as follows: 
 
(9)    α c-commands β in the following con-
figuration:  
(8) 
                               IP 
                          
                      DP            I’ 
                    John          
                                I           VP 
                              will     
             V’ 
        
         V          DP 
                         meet     Mary 
 
 (7)                                  
             … A … B …      A                B 
 
             α           γ        
        
        …  β  … 
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i.e., c-command holds in a configuration in 
which β is contained in the node γ which has 
been merged with α; γ is also called the “sister 
node” of α. So, we can say that α c-command β 
when β is contained in the sister node of α. 
C-command is a formal way to express 
structural prominence. For instance, as is clear 
from representations like (9), the subject c-
commands the direct object, but not vice-versa: 
the object is contained in I’, the sister node of 
the subject DP John; the object does not c-
command the subject because the subject John 
is not contained in the sister node of the object 
DP Mary, which is V. 
 C-command plays a pervasive role in the 
principles determining form and meaning of 
syntactic representations.   
Consider for instance agreement: the sub-
ject, but not the object, agrees with the verb in 
person and number in English: 
 
(10)   John has (*have) met the girls  
 
This follows from the fact that the sub-
ject, but not the object, locally c-commands 
the node I, containing the inflected verb, in 
representations like (8). Similarly, in  
 
(11)  A picture of the girls was (*were) hanging on the 
wall 
 
The copular verb agrees with the whole 
subject DP1 A picture of the girls, which local-
ly c-commands it, not with the adjacent DP2 
the girls, which does not c-command it:8 
In addition to being operative in all sorts 
of morphosyntactic processes, such as prop-
erties of the case-agreement system, c-
command is involved in interpretive process-
es. For instance, an anaphoric expression like 
a reflexive must be locally c-commanded by 
an antecedent which determines its refer-
ence. That is why a subject can bind an ana-
phoric object, but not vice-versa: 
 
(13)  a    Johni criticized himselfi 
        b * Himselfi criticized Johni   
 
Similarly, an anaphoric object can be 
bound by the subject DP, not by a possessive 
DP contained within the subject. I.e., the fol-
lowing sentences mean “John’s brother criti-
cized John’s brother”, and cannot mean 
“John’s brother criticized John”, with the 
possessive acting as the antecedent (whether 
the possessive is prenominal, as in English, or 
postnominal, as in Italian): 
 
(14) [ [ John ]’s brother] criticized himself  
 
(15) [ Il fratello di [ Gianni ]] ha criticato se stesso 
 
    “The brother of John has criticized himself” 
 
All these properties follow from the fact 
that anaphor binding requires c-command 
from the binder: the subject asymmetrically 
c-command the object, whence the facts of 
(13); and a possessive DP does not c-
command anything outside the DP that con-
tains it, whence the interpretive properties of 
(14)-(15). If the anaphor is DP internal, the 
possessive can bind it because c-command 
holds: 
 
(16) [ [ John ]’s picture of himself]  
was hanging from the wall 
 
Here too, binding is fine because the 
nominal specifier (the possessive) asymmet-
rically c-commands the nominal complement 
of picture: 
 
(16) [ [ John ]’s picture of himself]  
was hanging from the wall 
 
(12)                            IP 
                      
               DP1                          I’ 
                                     
      A picture PP                 I            VP 
                          was       
               of           DP2             hanging from the wall 
         
                      the girls 
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Here too, binding is fine because the 
nominal specifier (the possessive) asymmet-
rically c-commands the nominal complement 
of picture: 
So, here too complement and specifier 
could not be reversed, because in that case 
the anaphor would not be properly c-
commanded (hence bound): 
 
(18) *  [ [Himself]’s picture of John ]  
was hanging from the wall 
 
We are now ready to go back to the non-
coreference pattern that we started with in 
section 2, which also crucially depends on c-
command. 
 
█ Non-coreference 
 
Consider the tree representations of (1) 
and (2): 
In a classical paper Howard Lasnik9 ob-
served that the pronominal DP has the name 
in its domain of c-command in (20), but not 
in (19), which led him to state the following 
interpretive principle: 
 
(21) Non-coreference: A pronoun and a name cannot 
corefer when the pronoun c-commands the 
name. 
 
So, (21) precludes coreference in (20): 
there the pronominal subject of the main 
clause c-commands everything else, including 
the name subject of the embedded clause. In 
every other environment, coreference is an 
option. For instance in (19) the c-domain of 
the pronoun is limited to the embedded 
clause, the name subject of the main clause is 
external to the c-domain of the pronoun, 
hence (21) does not apply and coreference is 
possible. 
 
In (19) the name asymmetrically c-
commands the pronoun, but coreference is 
also possible in the environments in which 
neither element c-commands the other, and 
the pronoun and the name have disjoint c-
domains.  
 
This happens, for instance, in (4), whose 
structural representation is expressed with 
some simplification by the following tree: 
(19)         IP 
           
       DP               I’ 
     John                
 I            VP 
               
      V’ 
                                                                             
                 V            CP 
                                 said                 
                                            C              IP 
that      
  DP             I’ 
                                                   he        
                                                             I              AP 
                                                          was              | 
                                                                            sick    
 
(20)          IP 
           
       DP               I’ 
       He                   
   I               VP 
                   
          V’ 
                                                             
 V              CP 
                                    said                  
                                                 C              IP 
                                               that                                                                                       
DP             I’ 
                                                      John       
                                                                   I              AP 
                                                                was              | 
                                                                                   sick    
 
(17)         DP    
           
       DP             D’ 
         |                  
   John     D            NP 
                 ‘s            
     N’ 
                  
               N              PP 
                           picture                  
                                            of              DP                                                                     
                                                        himself           
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Here neither him nor John contain the 
other element in their c-domain, hence (21) 
does not apply and coreference is a viable op-
tion. 
When the pronominal element is part of a 
larger phrase, as the possessive his in (5), it 
can corefer with a following name because 
the possessive does not c-command the 
name, as is clear from the following tree rep-
resentation (the domain of c-command of 
the possessive is the DP his father, which 
does not include the name John): 
Notice that possessives are not exempted 
from the non-coreference constraint: if the 
possessive c-commands the name, corefer-
ence is barred. So his cannot refer to John in 
the following, i.e., the sentence cannot mean 
“John’s picture of his (John’s) father is hang-
ing from the wall”: 
 
(24) * Hisi picture of Johni’s father was hanging from 
the wall 
 
Finally, in (6), the pronominal subject of 
the preposed adverbial clause When he is sick 
does not c-command the main clause and its 
content, hence the name John and the pro-
noun he can corefer, as the non-coreference 
principle does not apply here:    
In conclusion, a complex array of inter-
pretive facts involving coreference follows 
from a simple principle such as Lasnik’s con-
straint, applying on hierarchical structural 
representations.  
The subtle distinctions that we have ob-
served in the complex non-coreference pat-
tern raise an interesting challenge for an un-
structured notion of “analogical generaliza-
tion”. The language learner will have access 
to a sample of sentences containing pro-
nouns; she will figure out from context that 
in some cases coreference with a nearby noun 
is intended, and in other cases it is not. E.g., 
in connection with (1): 
 
(26) John said that he was sick, and that’s why he 
couldn’t come. He’s always looking for excuses! 
(coreference between John and he is likely to be 
intended) 
 
(27) Nobody had understood why Bill had not showed 
 (22)               IP   
              
           DP                           I’ 
                                   
People    CP               I        VP 
                                
        who      IP                V’ 
       
                     V         CP 
    I        VP              say     
          C        IP 
        V          DP     that   
              Know       him           DP       I’ 
        John   
I       AP 
                                                                is        | 
             sick    
 
(23)         IP 
           
       DP               I’ 
                       
Poss    N       I            VP 
 His   father               
          V’ 
                                                             
 V              CP 
                                    said                  
                                                 C              IP 
                                               that                                                                                       
DP             I’ 
                                                      John      
                                                                   I              AP 
                                                                was              | 
                                                                                   sick    
 
(25)                        IP 
             
         CP                 IP 
                      
  C              IP     DP      I’ 
When        John       
          DP           I’                 I              VP 
           he              doesn’t    
                    I              AP         V    PP 
os            sick        go      to work 
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up, but then John said that he was sick (corefer-
ence between John and he is likely not to be in-
tended) 
 
On the basis of this evidence, why doesn’t 
the learner simply conclude, by analogical 
generalization, that coreference is always an 
option? But no one draws that conclusion, as 
everyone systematically excludes coreference 
in (2). 10  
Even assuming that the child has some 
way of inferring that with structures like (2) 
coreference is never intended, hence that 
some constraint must be assumed, why 
wouldn’t she assume a linear constraint and 
extend it by analogy to all cases of backward 
anaphora, thus implicitly assuming the linear 
rule (3) that is typically explicitly proposed in 
our toy experiment? But no language learner 
does that, as speakers readily recognize the 
possibility of backward coreference in con-
texts like (4), (5), (6).   It seems clear that, in 
order to reach empirical adequacy, an analo-
gy-based approach should build c-command 
into the notion of analogical generalization 
(something like “in evaluating coreference, 
analogize only constructions involving iden-
tical c-command configurations between 
nouns and pronouns”); but this move would 
de facto assume the highly structured config-
urational notions that the analogical ap-
proach is intended to avoid. In order to ade-
quately capture what speakers know and do, 
reference to the structured hierarchical no-
tion of c-command just seems unavoidable.  
Then, the question arises of the “further 
explanation” of constraint (21): should it be 
considered a primitive principle of the hu-
man language faculty, or could it be derived 
as a theorem from deeper and more general 
principles? Obviously, the desirable option is 
that a successful path of “further explana-
tion” may be identifiable. Here different ap-
proaches have been proposed. Chomsky 
originally suggested that (21) may follow 
from principle C, a component of the bind-
ing theory, the module expressing configura-
tional constraints on the possible referential 
dependencies between linguistic expressions; 
Reinhart11 proposed that the non-coreference 
effect may have its roots in the computation 
at the interface between syntax and pragmat-
ics, and be amenable to principles of optimi-
zation akin to Grice’s maxims. And other ap-
proaches have been proposed.12 I will not try 
to address the issue of the “further explana-
tion” here. The relevant point is that all these 
approaches  (definitely including Reinhart’s 
interface approach) crucially make reference 
to the hierarchical configuration of c-
command, which just seems unavoidable if 
the approach aims at meeting empirical ade-
quacy, and capture the selective effects we 
have reviewed. 
 
█  Invariance and variation 
 
Comparative considerations become rele-
vant at this point. If non-coreference effects 
follow from general principles of syntactic 
organization and interpretation at the inter-
faces, one expects to observe little or no 
cross-linguistic variation, under the assump-
tion that such principles are shared by our 
species. More precisely, one may expect vari-
ation, but not of an unconstrained kind: if 
general shared principles are involved, one 
may expect cross-linguistic studies to show a 
limited variation within a strongly invariant 
architecture. In fact, non coreference effects 
have been shown to hold in historically and 
typologically very different languages. A 
small sample:13 
 
(28)  
a (Italian)               
*  ___ pensa che Gianni vincerà  
 ___ thinks that Gianni will win 
 
 b (M. Hebrew)      
* hu ma’amin  she-John yenaceax  
* he thinks     that John    will win                
 
c (Thai)                    
* khaw  khit  waa  coon  chálaát  
* he  thinks   that John  is smart 
 
d (Vietnamese)      
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* no’    tin     John   se   thang    
* he  believes  John  will  win 
 
e (Gungbe) 
* e        vedo      do     Kofi    na    wa  
* he   believes  that   Kofi    will come 
 
f (Mohawk)             
* wa-hi-hrori-’tsi   Sak    ruwa-nuhwe’-s  
* fact-1sS/MsO-tell-punc that Sak FsS/MsO-like-hab 
* I told him that she likes Sak 
 
Nevertheless, the recent literature reports 
that non-coreference effects of the simple 
kind considered so far are not, strictly speak-
ing, universal. Some languages seem to allow 
coreference in a configuration in which the 
pronoun c-commands the name in particular 
structural configurations. 
Davies14 gives a comprehensive analysis of 
one such case, St’át’imcets (also known as 
Lillooet), an American Indian language  
member of the Salish family, spoken in the 
southwestern interior of British Columbia, 
Canada. The language manifests a certain 
freedom in word order, with a tendency to 
have predicate initial clausal structures and 
VOS order in transitive structures. Davis 
shows that for some speakers of the lan-
guage, a pronominal subject of a main clause 
can be coreferential with a name or definite 
description in an embedded clause: 
 
(29) 
Tsút=tu7 [kw=s=cuz’ nas ts’úqwaz’-am s=Mary 
natcw]. 
say=then [DET=NOM=going.to go fish-MID 
NOM=Mary tomorrow] 
 “Mary said she was going fishing tomorrow”.  
More literally: pro said Mary was going fishing tomor-
row.)15 
 
(30) 
Skenkín [lh=w=as nmatq xát’em ti7 ku=qelhmémen’ 
sqaycw áta7 tsítcw-s=a]. 
slow [COMP=IMPF=3CNJ walk uphill that DET=old 
man to house-3POSS=EXIS] 
“That old man walks slowly uphill to his house”.  
(More literally: pro is slow when that old man walks 
uphill to his house.) 
In other words, for some speakers of this 
language, the equivalent of “She said that 
Mary was going to finish tomorrow” allows 
the reading “she = Mary” (while other speak-
ers reject this reading, generally judged im-
possible by speakers of English).   
What conclusion should be drawn from 
this element of variation for the general theo-
ry of non-coreference effects? The rational 
approach, here and elsewhere, is to study an 
exceptional case to a very general pattern 
with great care, in order to determine the ex-
act scope and the fine structural properties of 
the “exception”. This is what Davies does, 
and the conclusion he reaches is that the ob-
served variation is not “wild”, but highly con-
strained. The language offers clear evidence 
for a configurational organization, and a sen-
sitivity of non-coreference effects from struc-
tural properties, such as c-command, e.g.: 
 
1. Apparent violations of principle C in 
St’át’imcets are limited to cases in which the 
pronoun and the name are in two distinct 
clauses; if they are in the same clause, famil-
iar non-coreference effects are found, much 
as in English and the languages in (28).16 In 
other words, the St’át’imcets equivalent of 
(31)a allows coreference, while the equiva-
lent of (31)b does not, much as its English 
counterpart: 
 
(31)  
a  She said Mary was going fishing tomorrow (* in 
English, ok in St’át’imcets) 
b  She smokes in Mary’s house (* in English, * in 
St’át’imcets) 
 
2. Violations of non-coreference are found 
for pronoun-name configuration but not 
for demonstrative – name (i.e., the equiv-
alent of English “That one said that John 
was sick” disallows coreference between 
That one and John, and much as the Eng-
lish equivalent does.) 
 
3. The language manifests Strong Crossover 
effects, which are traditionally seen as 
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cases of principle C violation. I.e., in Eng-
lish, while (33)a allows the bound reading 
of the pronoun (for which x, x said that 
Mary likes x), (33)b does not: 
 
(32) a   Whoi __ i said that Mary likes himi? 
         b * Whoi did hei say that Mary likes __i   
   
Davies shows that such strong cross-over 
effects hold in general in St’át’imcets as well, 
with no observed variation across speakers. 
This is illustrated by the following pair: 
 
(33)  
a.  Swat ku=kw7íkwlacw e [kw=s=cuz’ melyíh pro ka-
lál]? 
who DET=dream [DET=NOM=going.to marry 
soon] 
 “Who e dreamed [s/he was going to get married 
soon]?” 
 
b. *Swat ku=s-kw7íkwlacw-s pro [kw=s=cuz’ melyíh e 
kalál]? 
who DET=NOM-dream-3POSS [DET=NOM= 
going. to marry soon] 
* “Who did s/he dream [e was going to get married 
soon]?” 17 
 
Once the empirical scope of the exceptional 
behavior is identified, Davies adopts the ap-
proach to non coreference presented in Safir,18 
and argues in detail for a formal parametrisa-
tion of one of the principles of Safir’s theory 
(within the guidelines of Chomsky’s binding 
theoretic approach) to capture the observed 
cross-linguistic difference.   
Going into the details of Davis’s analysis 
is beyond the scope of the present article. Let 
me just observe that the important point to 
be retained from his approach for our theme 
is that non-coreference effects, like so many 
other linguistic phenomena, show elements 
of invariance and elements of variation. 
Here, as elsewhere, the observed variation 
never is “wild” and unconstrained: rather, 
languages typically allow “local” points of 
variation in an otherwise invariant structural 
architecture, based on configurational hier-
archies and relations such as c-command (as 
in the classical “principles and parameters” 
approach).19 Some properties appear to be 
strictly universal (as the strong cross-over ef-
fects),20 others appear to allow a limited 
range of variation within a tightly con-
strained and otherwise uniform system.21  
 
█  Conclusion 
 
Humans constantly produce and under-
stand sentences they have not heard before. 
This simple and crucial property of normal 
language use calls for a computational ap-
proach: knowing a language amounts to hav-
ing mastered a generative device capable of 
computing new structures. Studying even the 
most elementary formal and interpretive 
properties of linguistic representations, we 
quickly realize that the structural organization 
of such representations is hierarchical, with 
relations like c-command playing a crucial role 
in all sorts of syntactic processes, in morpho-
syntactic properties like agreement, in proper-
ties at the interface with semantics and prag-
matics such as the determination of referential 
dependencies of pronouns and other nominal 
expressions. Generic notions of analogy and 
analogical generalization don’t even begin to 
capture the fine properties and role of such 
hierarchical principles, which appear to be in-
timately related to the functioning of the fun-
damental combinatorial operations (recursive 
merge, in minimalist models).  
Mental computations extend well beyond 
what is accessible to consciousness and intro-
spection. We have conscious access to the 
representations which are computed, and 
this allows us to produce and understand new 
structures, and to express metalinguistic 
judgments of well-formedness and interpre-
tation. But we have no introspective access to 
the underlying computational mechanisms. 
So, the only way to address and conduct the 
scientific study of our cognitive capacities for 
language is to proceed as we would in the 
study of any other natural object: formulate 
precise hypotheses, and submit them to em-
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pirical verification through techniques as di-
verse as possible.  
We have only used a set of metalinguistic 
judgments in different languages in our illus-
trative example, but there is no reason to put 
any limitation to the kinds of linguistic evi-
dence that we may want to consider: so, the 
study of language acquisition (as in the refer-
ences mentioned above), language pathology, 
psycholinguistic experimentation, brain im-
aging studies can all be brought to bear on 
precise models of linguistic knowledge. If 
mental computations for language were ac-
cessible to consciousness, studying our com-
binatorial capacities would be straightfor-
ward; as linguistic computations are well be-
yond the reach of introspection, studying the 
properties of the system is a complex under-
taking which requires detailed formal hy-
potheses and structured techniques of empir-
ical testing, much as in the scientific study of 
any non-trivial aspect of the natural world. 
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